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Comment: Can Facial Recognition Technology Be Used To
Fight the New War Against Terrorism?: Examining the
Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Surveillance Systems
Kanya A. Bennett1
I. Introduction
The images of the September 11, 2001 tragedy are still
vivid for most Americans. In light of these events, many citizens
want to know how to prevent terrorist acts from happening again.
Most agree that the American way of life will forever be changed.
An expectation to travel around the country at a moment's notice is
no longer reasonable, nor are Americans as likely to demand living
our lives with little or no interference from the government. While
most Americans seemingly expect and are willing to sacrifice
some freedoms for assurance that we can live our lives in safety,
many wonder just how much we will have to sacrifice for such
assurances.
Because Americans live in one of the most technologically
advanced societies, our lives have already been monitored and our
freedoms constrained by highly intrusive means. Employers can
legally monitor their employees' e-mails, and automobile drivers
can be issued traffic tickets with the use of video cameras attached
to stoplights. This comment will focus on one of the most
intrusive means that recent technological advancements will now
allow to be imposed upon us in the name of combating crime and
ensuring safety: facial recognition.
1 J.D. Candidate 2002, University of North Carolina School of Law; B.S.,
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.
Facial recognition is part of a larger category of
technologies called biometrics that uses biological information,
such as iris scans and handprints, to confirm identity.2 The use of
facial recognition software in conjunction with public video
surveillance ("facial recognition surveillance") is quickly emerging
as a means of tracking down criminals and other wanted
individuals. In light of the September 1 1th tragedy, inquiries into
how this technology can be used to prevent future attacks of this
kind are now being explored with great urgency. Countering these
inquiries are concerns that this form of electronic surveillance may
be so intrusive that it violates our constitutional rights.
This Comment sets out to explore the constitutionality of
facial recognition surveillance in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. The evolution of this type of electronic surveillance
will be examined in Part II of this article. Part III of this article
will concentrate on how this technology works and will focus on
its use in the first United States city to implement such
surveillance. Part IV will discuss this type of surveillance and
possible Fourth Amendment implications. The use of facial
recognition technology in response to a national security interest,
such as that created by the September 1 1th tragedy, will also be
discussed in Part IV. Part V will conclude the Comment with a
discussion of possible safeguards that should be put in place for
this technology to operate effectively, whether use of the
technology is in fact constitutional or only warrants use in certain
situations.
2 Emelie Rutherford, Facial-Recognition Tech Has People Pegged (July 17,
2001), at http://cnn.com/2001/TECH/ptech/07/17/face.time.idg (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
H. Evolution of Facial Recognition Technology in the United
States
In the early 1960s, public video surveillance was
introduced into the private sector and utilized primarily by banks.3
By the next decade, use of this surveillance was widespread and
found in places such as hospitals and convenience stores.
4
However, use of this technology was limited because remote active
monitoring of video was relatively unavailable, and the quality of
film and cameras often resulted in blurry images.5 Starting in the
mid-1980s, improvements began to be made with video technology
and these problems were minimized.6 These new advancements
included things such as zoom lenses and digital technology. 7 This
allowed video cameras to collect distinct, vivid images without
much lighting.8 With the expansion of video capabilities came
experimentation with this form of technology and biometrics.
Practical applications merging biometrics technology, particularly
facial recognition, with video technology were first sought after by
the United States government as a possible means of ensuring
national security. 9
3 MARCUS NIETO, PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: IS IT AN EFFECTIVE CRIME
PREVENTION TOOL? (June 1997), available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05/ (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).4 Id.
5id.
6id.
7id.
8id.
9 John D. Woodard, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the
Concerns--Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 109
(1997).
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The United States Department of Defense has funded
university scientists' work on facial recognition technology for
over a decade. 10 Department of Defense officials have been
focused on perfecting this technology to better spot criminals at
our country's borders." Likewise, private companies determined
that this technology could combat crime within the country's
borders and began marketing use of this technology in the mid-
1990s.12
A few companies have developed facial recognition
software to be used in conjunction with video surveillance
cameras; the most well-known of these is Visionics Corporation of
Jersey City, New Jersey. In addition to marketing its product as a
high-tech, identity recognition device that can be used to combat
crime, Visionics Corp. also describes its facial recognition system
as an efficient means to verify employee and student identity.13 In
order to understand the vast capabilities of facial recognition
surveillance, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of how
this technology works.
10 Rutherford, supra note 2.
11 d.12 id.
13 Visionics Corp. website, at http://www.visionics.com/faceit/whatis.html (last
visited September 21, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (providing a description of Facelt applications and uses).
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HI. How Facial Recognition Technology Works and Its Use in
the United States
A. How Facial Recognition Technology Works
The use of facial recognition software with video
surveillance is a complex technological process. In marketing its
software FaceIt, Visionics Corp. has offered a layperson's
description of how its product works. Video cameras are used to
scan an area.14 Faces within a 35-degree angle of the camera can
be extracted from the people in the monitored area.15 It takes only
a split second for the camera to identify a face from among the
other images it is monitoring. 16 The software then measures
between fourteen and twenty-two of the approximately eighty
nodal points that make up an individual's face.17 Nodal points are
those facial features that make each face unique.18 Nodal points
include such characteristics as depth of eye sockets, distance
between eyes, and width of nose. 
9
Once these points have been identified, the nodal point
measurements are turned into a comprehensive numerical code,
which is called a faceprint.2 ° Millions of faceprints can be
compared to the database of stored faceprints in a minute.2'
14 Kevin Bonsor, How Facial Recognition Works, at
http://www.howstuffworks.com/facial-recognition.htm (last visited Oct. 8. 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
15 Id.
16 Id
"
17 Rutherford, supra note 2.
18 Bonsor, supra note 15.
20 Id.
21T
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Comparisons are ranked by the software using a scale of one to
ten, and a match is declared based on that rank.22 Some systems
have been programmed to alert a match if the comparison rates at
least an "eight," while others have been programmed to alert a
match only if the comparison rates a "ten.' 23 To ensure accuracy,
a human operator monitoring the facial recognition surveillance
system compares the face that has been captured by camera to the
photograph in the database that has been declared its match.
24
Facial recognition systems marketed by other companies use
slightly different methods, but achieve similar results.25
B. Use of Facial Recognition Technology in the United States
Widespread implementation of facial recognition
technology has yet to be realized in the United States. Even
though use is not prevalent here, the capacities in which this
software is used in conjunction with video surveillance vary.
Facial recognition technology uses include identifying cheaters at
casinos and confirming identities of driver's license applicants.
26
The technology has also been used at banks' automated teller
machines to protect customers from having fraudulent transactions
conducted in their names.27 Federal, state and local officials may
also eventually model their use of facial recognition technology
22 id.
23 rd.
24 d.
25 See Graphco Technologies website, at http://www.graphcotech.com (last
visited October 8, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (providing a description of Graphco's FaceTrac software).26 Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Matching Faces With Mug Shots, WASHINGTON POST,
Aug. 1, 2001, at A01.27 Id.
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after the way other countries use this technology. In Mexico, for
example, facial recognition has been used to prevent voter fraud by
ensuring that no person votes more than once.28
While facial recognition systems have proven successful in
these different applications, companies distributing the product
emphasize the way that this technology can be used on streets and
in other major public areas to identify criminals at large.29 In order
to increase the use of facial recognition systems for this particular
purpose, companies have agreed to let selected city law
enforcement agencies test their products for free.
°
Tampa, Florida has benefited from these companies'
generous offers of free trial software. It was the first city in the
United States to experiment with facial recognition surveillance.
31
The city has utilized facial recognition systems by two different
companies.
32
The system first used by Tampa law enforcement was
provided by Graphco Technologies for the Super Bowl. 33 The
system was installed in an attempt to comb through the Super34
Bowl crowd for felons and terrorists. Graphco's software,
FaceTrac, operates in much the same way as the FaceIt software
manufactured by Visionics Corp.35 Cameras were installed both
28 Bonsor, supra note 14.
29 O'Harrow, supra note 26.
30 Lane DeGregory, Click. BEEP! Face Captured, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, July
19, 2001, at 1D.31 id.
32 Richard M. Smith, Digital Frisking in Tampa Must Go (July 16, 2001), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/600153.asp?cpl=l (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).33 Td.34 Rutherford, supra note 2.
35 Graphco Technologies website, supra note 25.
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around Raymond James Stadium (the Super Bowl site) and in
Tampa's entertainment district, Ybor City.36 However, such
surveillance focused on Super Bowl-related events taking place in
and around the stadium. Nineteen individuals with outstanding
warrants were identified at the stadium through the facial
recognition system, but no arrests were made.
37
Tampa's city council and law enforcement officials decided
to continue using this type of surveillance, but the focus is now on
Ybor City rather than on the stadium. In addition to changing its
focus, the city has also chosen to switch facial recognition systems.
Visionics Corp. has allowed the city to monitor its Ybor City
district with its product for one year at no cost.38 An estimated
125,000 people frequent Ybor City every Friday, and the
likelihood that a criminal could be lurking in this crowd is high.39
Thirty-six video cameras have been installed in this area.
40
The facial images recorded by the cameras are compared to
photographs in three separate databases, which include individuals
who are wanted felons, sexual predators, and missing children.
41
The database currently consists of a few hundred photographs
which come from existing local law enforcement files, but FaceIt
manufacturers plan to expand the database to include 30,000
photographs. 42 A law enforcement officer, operating this system
36 Associated Press, 'Big Brother' Cameras Hit Tampa (July 2, 2001), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/595361.asp (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).3 7 Id.
38 DeGregory, supra note 30.
3 9 
rd.
40 rd.
4 1 id.
42 id.
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at a small, disguised computer center in Ybor City, is responsible
for selecting the faces in the crowd that will be turned into
faceprints and then compared to the photographs in the databases.43
As the cameras actively monitor several areas, the officer can
manipulate a particular camera's focus by using a computerized
joystick mechanism. 44
After the officer has used the joystick to zoom in on a
particular face in the crowd, the software determines if there is an
80 percent or higher probability that a match has been made
between the targeted face and a face in the database.45 If such a
match has been made, an alarm sounds prompting the officer to do
a visual comparison of the face scanned with the photograph in the
database.46 If the officer's personal scan verifies an accurate
match, she now has reasonable suspicion that this person is a
wanted criminal or missing child.4' This allows her to radio
officers on the street in Ybor City and have them conduct a
temporary stop.
48
43
44 id.
45 Id.
47 id.
48 Id. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that when a police
officer observes unusual conduct that leads him to reasonably suspect that
criminal activity is at large, he may briefly detain the suspect in order to make
inquiries).
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IV. Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Video Surveillance
Systems
A. Video Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
Since video surveillance with facial recognition capabilities
is a fairly new technological advancement, courts have not yet
determined the legality of its use. Federal statutes have not
specifically addressed its use either.49 In addition to the lack of
case law and statutes that speak to the use of facial recognition
surveillance, the precedent applicable to video surveillance in
general is not very helpful.
There are no federal laws that specifically regulate the use
of public video surveillance. Lower court decisions on the use of
video surveillance rely on Supreme Court rulings on audio
surveillance cases.50 Some courts have also made decisions based
on interpretations of federal laws that regulate electronic
surveillance but do not address video surveillance specifically.51
Therefore, in order to determine the legality of facial recognition
surveillance, it is important to understand the implications of this
technology in the context of the Fourth Amendment. This will
allow courts and legislatures to determine if facial recognition
surveillance should be allowed the same warrantless use with
which general video surveillance has traditionally functioned.
In Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment affords constitutional protection
49 Quentin Burrows, Note, Scowl Because You're On Candid Camera: Privacy
and Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1997).
50 Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video
Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295, 315 (1999).
5
'Id. at 316.
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to those areas, both private and public, in which a person
reasonably expects privacy.52 A search impeding an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy requires a warrant or,
alternatively, must involve exigent circumstances.53 The defendant
in Katz was convicted of illegally conveying gambling information
by telephone.54 The FBI used the defendant's recorded
conversations to convict him.55 The FBI had obtained this
evidence by attaching a monitoring device to the outside of the
phone booth that Katz regularly used.56 The Court reasoned that
even though the phone booth was in a public area, the Fourth
Amendment protects any activity an individual intends to be
private, such as the phone conversation the defendant was having
inside the phone booth.57
The test identified in Katz for determining a lawful search
under the Fourth Amendment consists of two parts.5 ' First, a
subjective expectation of privacy must be held by the individual
and second, this privacy interest must be objectively recognized by
society.59
While the facts in Katz involved the unauthorized
electronic eavesdropping of oral communications, courts have used
the principles pertaining to privacy and the Fourth Amendment
established in Katz to determine when the use of video surveillance
is legally permissible. As discussed previously, an individual's
52 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
531d. at 354-56.
541d. at 348.
55 id.
56id.
571d. at 352-53.
58 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).59Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy has been the primary factor in
determining what activities are deserving of constitutional
protection. Courts have upheld the use of video surveillance
without a warrant in places where individuals do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy such as public streets and
sidewalks, employee work areas, and public school classrooms.6 °
This lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
realm of public video surveillance can be based upon the plain
view doctrine established by the Supreme Court one year after
Katz in Harris v. United States. 61 The Court stated, "it has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be introduced in evidence."
62
The plain view doctrine, as discussed in Harris, has often
been used to determine that video surveillance of most public areas
does not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.63 Public video surveillance equates to activity falling
60 Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding that "employees do not have an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the open areas of the workplace"); United States v. Vazquez, 31 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 91 (Dist. Conn. 1998) (holding that a common law right to privacy
does not extend to public streets and sidewalks because no one in these areas has
a legitimate expectation of privacy); State v. McLellan, 744 A.2d 611, 615 (N.H.
1999) (holding that a classroom is not a private place in which an individual
could reasonably expect to be safe from surveillance).
61 United States v. Harris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
62 Id. at 236.
63 Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 180; Int'l Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187,
191 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (holding that an "individual has no right to expect that
persons passing by on the street will not take note of-- and draw inferences
from -- the presence of the individual's car parked on the street in plain view for
all to see").
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within the plain view of an officer since such surveillance cameras
have been deemed the equivalent of robotic police officers.64 The
video surveillance does not capture any activity that a human
police officer could not have seen with her eyes had she been in
the public area where the activity was taking place.
In addition to using the principles established in Katz,
courts have looked to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Omnibus Crime Act") to determine the
legality of video surveillance.65 Title III was enacted in response
to Katz and is the closest that Congress has come to specifically
regulating video surveillance. 66 Interception of electronic, wire,
and oral communications is specifically regulated by Title III, but
video surveillance without audio capabilities is not.67 Therefore,
silent video surveillance, which would encompass the majority of
cameras being used to monitor public areas, is left unregulated.
Some court decisions have interpreted this legislative silence to
mean that Title III is not applicable to video surveillance. 68 Other
courts have made video surveillance search warrant requirements
comparable to the requirements set out by Title 111.6
9
64 SCOTT SHER, CONTINUOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND ITS LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES, Public Law Research Institute Report, University of California-
Hastings College of Law Working Papers Series (Fall 1996).65 United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Torres, 751
F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).66 Burrows, supra note 49, at 1096.
67 18 U.S.C. 2518 (2001).
68 United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Johnson
Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 96-3223, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5832 (D. Kan. March
25, 1997).69 Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 510 (holding that "these standards, borrowed from Title
III, together with the more general constitutional requirements, form a sufficient
FALL 2001]
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B. Facial Recognition Video Surveillance Systems and the
Fourth Amendment
Courts have found repeatedly that warrantless video
surveillance of public areas does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, and it seems likely that courts will take the same
approach toward public surveillance systems incorporating facial
recognition software. At first glance, the use of facial recognition
technology in this manner may constitute an unreasonable invasion
of an individual's privacy due to its great degree of intrusion. In a
sense, all individuals in the camera's path are subject to a police
lineup. 70 This lineup is also extremely advanced because, as
discussed previously, it provides police with information such as
the width of an individual's nose and the depth of an individual's
eye sockets. This is not detectable by mere eyesight but requires
measuring devices.71 So while individuals may have no reasonable
expectation of privacy when they utilize public spaces, such as
shopping malls, parking lots, and airports, it would seem that they
would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these same areas
when facial recognition systems are used to monitor their behavior.
However, the constitutionality of facial recognition technology
may not be so clear-cut.
outline of the showing the government must make before a warrant should issue
authorizing video surveillance").70 Martin Kasindorf, 'Big Brother' Cameras on Watch for Criminals (Oct. 2,
2001), at http://www.usatoday.con/life/cyber/tech/2001-08-02-big-brother-
cameras.htm#more (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
71 Bonsor, supra note 14.
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As intrusive as facial recognition technology appears to be,
it must be determined if its use in a public area is so intrusive as to
constitute an unreasonable search and entitle individuals to Fourth
Amendment protection as just suggested. The two-part test
established in Katz to determine an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy in a particular situation balances an
individual's privacy interests with society's need for law
enforcement to maintain order.72 When considering the balancing
test for reasonableness of searches, the intrusiveness of facial
recognition systems in public areas may not infringe on an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy as much as it
ensures society's safety.
1. Physical Intrusion
A determinative factor in this balancing test is assessing if
the use of facial recognition constitutes a physical intrusion upon
an individual's body. Drawing blood, taking urine samples, and
imposing a breathalyzer test all have been found to be Fourth
Amendment searches, therefore requiring a warrant or exigent
circumstances. 73 If facial recognition technology is comparable to
these bodily invasions, using it would constitute a search. If this is
the case, warrantless use of this technology could only occur if
both exigent circumstances existed and it was obvious that
fundamental evidence would be obtained.74
It is unlikely that a court would consider the use of facial
recognition systems to monitor public areas a search based on its
72 SLIER, supra note 64.
73 Woodard, supra note 9, at 124.74 ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: LAW AND PRACTICE 181
(2d ed. 1991).
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level of physical intrusiveness. When an individual's face is
subjected to an in-depth computerized analysis, no actual physical
intrusion on the body is being made. In fact, an individual does
not need to knowingly surrender anything of the person for the
system to work. Therefore, this level of intrusiveness does not
actually invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in
light of government interests.
2. Plain View
An analysis of facial recognition surveillance under the
Harris plain view doctrine also suggests that it would pass muster
under the Katz two-part test. Harris should apply to these systems
in much the same way it applies to general public video
surveillance systems. These facial recognition systems monitor
public areas in which a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy because he is knowingly placing himself in
plain view of other people, as well as the cameras. Arguably, with
the facial recognition system, the camera is doing more than just
monitoring what is in plain view of its lens. However, the
Supreme Court has held various technological devices that have
been used to enhance law enforcement's senses to be
constitutional.75
75 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that the
warrantless taking of photographs from an aircraft lawfully in the public
airspace that is sufficiently near the reach of the cameras does not constitute a
search); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that a
driver's reasonable expectation of privacy is not violated with law
enforcement's use of an electronic device to follow his vehicle on the public
roads); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (holding that "the use of
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 3
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3. Sensory Enhancing Devices
The Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment
protection does not extend to law enforcement's warrantless
observations made from public property through such sensory
enhancing devices as flashlights, electronic tracking devices, and
aerial cameras.76 The rationale provided by the Supreme Court is
that observations with these devices are made from areas where
police have the right to be, and the observations could be made
with "plain view" surveillance performed without the device.
77
In June 2001, the Supreme Court differentiated the use of sensory
enhancing technology in some situations in Kyllo v. United
States.78 In Kyllo, the police suspected that the defendant was
growing marijuana inside his home with the use of high-intensity
lamps.7' The police used a thermal imaging device to determine if
the exterior of defendant's home was emitting a significant amount
of heat that would be consistent with the amount of heat generated
by the high-intensity lamps.80 The Court stated, "Where, as here,
the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." 81
artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a
search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection").7 6 
rd.
77 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.7 8 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
79Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041.
80 rd.
811d. at 2046.
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In reaching its decisions, the Court focused on two issues: that the
inside of an individual's home is so intimate as to give her a
reasonable expectation of privacy and that the general public is not
aware that their privacy can easily be invaded through such
technology.
82
The warrantless use of facial recognition software with
public video surveillance appears lawful in that it is consistent with
these Supreme Court decisions on sensory enhancing devices. The
cameras monitor public areas to which enforcement officers have
access, and the observations made with the facial recognition
system could be made without its use. Using this system is the
equivalent of officers observing a crowd and comparing the faces
in it to those in a criminal face book; it is just much faster and may
be more accurate.83 Based on this analogy, facial recognition
surveillance, like general video surveillance, can be viewed as the
equivalent of a robotic police officer.
Even though Kyllo has narrowed the circumstances in
which warrantless use of advanced technology can be used to
conduct a search, public video surveillance systems using facial
recognition software remain within the realm of these
circumstances. Although facial recognition technology is not in
general public use, utilizing this technology with public
surveillance is not so invasive because it does not intrude upon an
area in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The Supreme Court suggests that both criteria need to be
met in order to trigger Fourth Amendment protection.
Accordingly, if this technology were to be used to determine the
2 d. at 2043-44.
83 Milligan, supra note 50, at 319.
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identities of individuals within a home or another private area, then
it is likely that such use would require a warrant as well.
C. Constitutionality In Light of Threats to National Security
There appears to be only one context in which the use of
facial recognition technology in this manner poses no
constitutional questions. This context is the use of facial
recognition systems in response to a threat to national security. In
a footnote, the Katz majority alluded to the idea that this type of
circumstance may have changed the outcome of the case by stating
that "a situation involving the national security is a question not
presented by this case."84 This suggests that there may be
situations in which a search that ordinarily would be considered
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment could be conducted
without a warrant and still be regarded as having been
constitutionally valid. The Omnibus Crime Act also provides for
exceptions to the warrant requirement in light of emergency
situations, such as threats to national security.
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, signed into law on
October 26th, has also expanded the government's surveillance
capabilities in order to protect the country in its current state of
crisis following the September 1 lth terrorist attacks.86 The Act
provides federal agents with new and expanded powers, mainly by
eliminating the system of checks and balances that had been
previously used by courts to regulate these powers.87 Previous
4 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
85 18 U.S.C 2518(7)(a) (2001).
16 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
87id.
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restrictions on how agents could tap a suspect's phone or conduct
secret searches of a suspect's home have now been softened.88
While the Act does not specifically regulate video
surveillance or facial recognition technology, it is possible that
courts will apply its provision to such technology in much the
same manner as the Omnibus Crime Act's Title III has been
deemed applicable to silent video surveillance. For example,
because the Act has relaxed some of the previous warrant
requirements to conduct secret searches, it is possible that facial
recognition surveillance could be used secretly at a suspect's home
to identify other suspects.
V. Conclusion: Safeguards for Facial Recognition Surveillance
This country could see widespread use of public facial
recognition surveillance in response to the September 1 1th tragedy.
Even though constitutional issues surrounding the use of this type
of surveillance under ordinary circumstances are unresolved,
implementation of this surveillance in certain situations may be
necessary to protect our country from future terrorist attacks of a
similar nature.
In the weeks following the tragedy, facial recognition was
the topic of discussion in various news forums. Proponents for and
against the use of facial recognition have voiced their opinions.
Supporter Richard Chace-of the Security Industry Association said
upon seeing videotape footage of one of the terrorists walking
through a terminal at Logan International Airport, he knew that
had the security cameras that had taken the footage been equipped
with facial recognition technology, this particular hijacking might
" Id. at §§ 206, 213.
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have been prevented. 89 However, opponent Howard Simon,
Executive Director of the Florida ACLU, has stated his belief that
this type of surveillance will perpetuate the practice of racial
profiling.90 Recognizing these concerns, safeguards need to be in
place even though the country's current circumstances clearly
warrant use of this technology. Safeguards are also necessary if it
is later determined that this type of technology is constitutional
under normal circumstances.
One of these necessary safeguards would involve placing
restrictions on where this type of surveillance could be used. This
would limit some of the intrusiveness that would be experienced
with widespread implementation of this technology. This
restriction would also prevent the police from targeting specific
communities that are stereotypically identified as high crime areas,
such as low income and minority communities. 91 The use of facial
recognition surveillance should be limited to major public areas,
primarily major transportation centers like airports, bus and train
terminals, subways, and car rental agencies.92 This surveillance
should also be implemented at government buildings and at our
country's major economic centers like the Department of Justice
and the Sears Tower. Considering the manner in which the
89 The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 27, 2001).
90 Press Release, ACLU Freedom Network, ACLU Probes Police Use of Facial-
Recognition Surveillance Cameras in Florida City, ACLU Freedom Network,
July 6, 2001, available at <www.aclu.org/news/2001/n070601a.html>.
91 Milligan, supra note 50 at 328 (discussing how public video surveillance was
first used for law enforcement purposes on Miami Beach only after the once
elderly community experienced lower income Black and Latino citizens moving
into it).
92 See Addie S. Ries, Comment, America's Anti-hijacking Campaign-Will It
Conform to Our Constitution?, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2001), elsewhere in
this issue.
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September 1 1th terrorist attacks were carried out, these are ideal
locations for such surveillance systems.
It appears the government is already looking into such use.
The Department of Transportation committee responsible for
restructuring airport security met with the president of Visionics
Corp., Joseph Atick. Atick and the committee discussed how
airport security cameras could utilize Facelt software.93 The facial
images recorded by camera would be compared with a database of
photos of known or suspected terrorists. 94 Government officials at
a federal monitoring station would be notified of a potential match
instantly through the Internet. 95 After their involvement with the
September 1 lth tragedy, Washington D.C.'s Reagan National
Airport and Boston's Logan International Airport have been
identified by government officials as potential sites for initial
implementation of facial recognition systems.96 Facial recognition
systems were also purchased by or donated to at least two other
U.S. airports in the three months following September 1 lth, so the
Department of Transportation decided that the surveillance is
legal.97
In addition to limiting the locations where facial
recognition surveillance systems would be used, the systems' uses
93 Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Facial Recognition System Considered For U.S.
Airports, WASHINGTON POST, September 24,2001, at A14.94 id.
95 rd.
96 rd.
97 See Associated Press, Hi-tech Interrogation Comes to OAK (Oct. 19, 2001), at
http://www.msnbc.com/local/kntv/m105587.asp (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); Associated Press, State of the Art Security
System Tested at Fresno Airport, at
http://www.msnbc.com/local/ksee/a13001.asp (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
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could be further limited if the photo databases only contain the
images of known or suspected terrorists. By limiting the category
of criminals that are being monitored with this system, the
opportunity for a police officer to operate this system in a biased
manner is lessened. A facial recognition surveillance system,
operating in much the same way as that in Tampa's Ybor City,
would be monitored and operated by a police officer. Because the
police officer selects those faces that are going to be scanned into
the system, there is the potential that the officer would scan only
those faces he associates with a criminal profile. More often than
not, the faces that are associated with that profile are the faces of
minorities.98 Even limiting the database to photographs of known
or suspected terrorists may lead to the racial profiling of
individuals of Arab descent.99 A much-needed safeguard would
involve decreasing the amount of human element involved in this
surveillance system. Rather than having the police officer who is
monitoring the surveillance system choose which faces will be
scanned into the system, the system itself could be designed to
control that decision.
It is obvious the most needed safeguard for facial
recognition technology is the implementation of federal regulations
to monitor its use or a Supreme Court decision on its
constitutionality. With facial recognition going into United States
airports, the likelihood is great that the constitutionality of its use
will be challenged soon in the judicial system. Federal law or
98 See John Stossel, Rethinking Racial Profiling: How the Attacks Have
Changed Views (Oct. 3, 2001), at
http://abcnews.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_011002_racialprofiling-stossel.ht
ml (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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regulations may soon be implemented as well."° However, until
such are in place, law enforcement, airport security, and other
agencies that utilize facial recognition technology should
proactively ensure that society will benefit from its use. This
technology has the potential to provide citizens with increased
safety, but it also has the potential to unreasonably invade their
privacy.
100 See Ries, supra note 92.
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